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seeking a writ has the heavy burden of showing that the propriety of its
issuance is clear and indisputable." Viewing the legislative intent and the
ramifications of the possible res judicata consequences to Calvert's federal
claim it is arguable that an abuse of discretion had taken place, thus the
mandamus remedy should have been granted.
There can be no question that docket control is imperative if a court is
to adjudicate in a swift and orderly fashion." But when legislative intent
is clear on the question of exclusive jurisdiction and a stay is ordered, a
conflict of policy exists. Mandamus has been and can continue to be an
aid to appellate jurisdiction as well as a source of relief to a stifled litigant.
The small loss of docket control that a district court would suffer in these
exceptional cases is subordinate to the justice and its orderly administration that would follow the careful exercise of the writ. When these factors
are combined with frustration of legislative intent and the possible denial
of a federal forum as in Will, the need for a mandamus remedy is even more
pressing.
James P. Keenan

FEDERAL COURTS-Civil Contempt-Federal District
Courts Have No Authority To Interrupt Preexisting
State Sentence To Impose Confinement for
Civil Contempt
In re Liberatore,
574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978).
While serving two consecutive one year sentences for violations of Connecticut law, Thomas A. Liberatore was called before a federal grand jury
in the District of Connecticut to provide handwriting exemplars and major
case fingerprints. Upon Liberatore's continued refusal to provide them,
and in accordance with the federal Recalcitrant Witnesses statute' the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the writ of.mandamus to vacate the stay was
proper. Id. at 282.
65. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., __U.S.....
98 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 57 L. Ed. 2d
504, 511 (1978); United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
66. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967) (docket control imperative for
orderly administration of district court).
1. The Recalcitrant Witnesses statute provides in part:
(a) Whenever a witness ... refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order
of the court to testify or provide other information . . .the court, upon such refusal
...may summarily order his confinement . . .until such time as the witness is
willing to give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of(1) the court proceeding, or

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 3, Art. 14

19791

CASE NOTES

federal district court ordered that Liberatore be confined for civil contempt
and that his state sentence be suspended during the confinement. Liberatore appealed, challenging this order on the ground that the federal district
court lacked the authority to interrupt the service of the state sentence he
was already serving. 2 Held-Affirmed in part, reversed in part. A federal
district court has no authority to interrupt a preexisting state sentence to
confine a recalcitrant witness for civil contempt.3
Judicial power to interfere with a prisoner's sentence has long been
limited.' At common law, a trial court's judgment was within the court's
control during the term in which it was made; 5 provided the punishment
was not augmented, a court could amend, modify, or vacate the judgment.'
Once the defendant had begun to serve his sentence, however, a court was
without power to set aside or modify it,' since the court's authority over
the prisoner ended when the original sentence went into effect.' Two exceptions to this general rule permitted sentence interruption after the prisoner
had begun to serve his term. One exception allowed a court to substitute
a valid sentence for one that was void? Under the second exception, a court
(2) the term of the grand jury ....
28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
2. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1978). Liberatore challenged the order on
two other points: that he was not afforded adequate notice of opportunity to defend against
the charge of contempt, and that the government failed to demonstrate the relevance and
necessity of the prints and handwriting exemplars sought by the grand jury. Id. at 80. Holding
that Liberatore waived the first point by not preserving it in the district court and holding
that the government had no burden to make a preliminary showing that the materials were
necessary, the court refuted both of these contentions. Id. at 82.
3. Id.at 90.
4. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788,
789 (10th Cir. 1930).
5. Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); see United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1931). Since
the prisoner's sentence was "in the breast of the court," it could be "amended, modified, or
vacated by that court." Id. at 306-07 (citing Goddard v. Ordway, 101 U.S. 745, 752 (1879)).
6. See Fletcher v. State, 128 S.W.2d 997, 999 (Ark. 1939); State v. Everett, 79 S.E. 274,
277 (N.C. 1913); Ex parte Cox, 29 Tex. Ct. App. 84, 87, 14 S.W. 396, 397 (1890). But see In
re Jones, 53 N.W. 468, 469 (Neb. 1892) (court had no power to vacate original sentence to
impose a new one).
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Rice, 57 Me. 55, 58 (1869); Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass.
(2 Allen) 144, 147 (1861); State v. Cannon, 2 P. 191, 192 (Or. 1884). See generally Annot.,
168 A.L.R. 706 (1947).
8. Cf. People v. Meservey, 42 N.W. 1133, 1134 (Mich. 1889) (authority over prisoner
passed when first sentence went into effect); State v. Cannon, 2 P. 191, 192 (Or. 1884) (court
had done all it had legal power to do).
9. See In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1894). This exception usually involves cases
in which a sentence has been imposed by a court having no jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Bell,
137 F.2d 716, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1943); Nelson v. Foley, 223 N.W. 323, 324 (S.D. 1929). It also
applies when the sentence imposed is within the power of the trial court but is erroneous or
irregular. See Simmons v. United States, 89 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir.) (sentence set aside when
in excess of maximum fixed by statute), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937); DeBenque v.
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could interrupt a prisoner's sentence because of an intentional act the
prisoner had committed, thereby postponing the termination date of the
sentence."' This "fault of the prisoner" exception allowed a court to interrupt the running of a criminal sentence in cases involving escape," violation of military confinement, 2 or revocation of parole. 3 Generally, however, the prisoner has a recognized right to serve his sentence without
interruption.
An early state case considered the authority of a jurisdiction to interrupt
its own sentence to impose a charge of contempt.'" In Williams v. State
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state court possessed no power
to interrupt a prisoner's confinement under a state sentence to impose an
intervening punishment for contempt. 7 More recently, in Martin v. United
States' a federal district court's interruption of a federal criminal sentence
to impose a civil contempt sentence was allowed. 9 Martin and other courts
of appeals have held that a federal court has the authority to interrupt a
United States, 85 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir.) (sentence of indeterminate term held void because
contrary to statute), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 681 (1936).
10. Compare McDonald v. Lee, 217 F;2d 619, 623 (5th Cir: 1954) (second sentence for
violating military confinement conditions interrupts running of first sentence), vacated as
moot, 349 U.S. 948 (1955) with White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (prisoner
mistakenly discharged from prison allowed credit for time spent at liberty).
11. See Theriault v. Peek, 406 F.2d 117, 117 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1021 (1969).
12. See McDonald v.Lee, 217 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S.
948 (1955).
13. See Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923).
14. See Martin v.United tates, 517 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion) (quoting White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930)) (unless interrupted by escape or
other fault of prisoner sentence is continuous), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); cf. State
v. Buck, 25 S.W. 573, 578 (Mo. 1894) (prisoner cannot be tried for another felony until he
has served first sentence unless judgment set aside or reversed).
15. United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975); see Williams v. State, 188 S.W. 826, 827 (Ark. 1916).
16. 188 S.W. 826 (Ark. 1916).
17. Id. at 827. There are two types of contempt, civil and criminal. The nature and
purpose of the punishment determines the character of a contempt order. See Southern Ry.
Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968). "Civil contempt is'wholly remedial' .
and is intended to coerce compliance with an order of the court . .

.

. Criminal contempt

is punitive, . . . serves to vindicate the authority of the court, and cannot be ended by
any act of the contemnor." Id. at 124-25. Criminal contempt is a fixed sentence served after
the contemnor-prisoner has served his original sentence. Since the contemnor must serve a
criminal contempt sentence regardless whether he subsequently purges his contempt, criminal contempt has no inherent coercive element as does civil contempt. See United States v.
Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975). See generally
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 77, 555 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing feature between civil and criminal contempt is order's purpose); Skinner v. White,
505 F.2d 685, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1974) (lists "essential distinctions" between civil and criminal
contempt); Annot. 61 A.L.R. 2d 1083 (1958); Annot. 14 A.L.R. 2d 580 (1950).
18. 517 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
19. Id. at 907.
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federal criminal sentence to impose confinement for civil contempt.*-' It
has been argued that 18 U.S.C. § 356821 required a criminal sentence to
be continuously served, thus allowing no interruption under the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute. 2 This argument has been refuted in two ways.
Some courts harmonized the two statutes noting that since the interruption of a criminal sentence was based on civil contempt, there was no
violation of section 3568 which requires that credit be given for any confinement connected with the original offense." Other courts reasoned that
section 3568 was never intended to apply to a fault of the prisoner situation
wherein a contemnor-prisoner interrupts his own sentence by his intentional refusal to testify. 4 Strong dissents in these cases went beyond the
question of statutory authority, to question the constitutionality of
"sandwiching" a sentence for civil contempt within a preexisting sentence.25 These dissenting opinions stress that the fifth amendment to the
Constitution proscribes trying an individual twice for the same offense"
20. See In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Investigation

(Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977);
United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 410, 411 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
924 (1976); Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856
(1975); Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309, 1310 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States
v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975); Anglin v.
Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1970) provides in part:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such
person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection
with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
No sentence shall prescribe any other method of computing the term.
22. In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978).
23. Id. at 1375; see Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 856 (1975).
24. In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); see United States v. Liddy, 510
F.2d 669, 673-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).
25. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 173 (3d Cir.
1976) (dissenting opinion) (majority interpretation of Recalcitrant Witnesses statute presents
serious double jeopardy considerations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); Martin v. United
States, 517 F.2d 906, 915 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion)(court's compelling of prisoner's
testimony is harassment which violates double jeopardy clause), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856
(1975); United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion) (extending expiration date of original sentence increases punishment, violating double jeopardy
clause), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).
26. Accord, United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 170 (1873); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. "The prohibition is not against being
twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy ... ." United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 669 (1896). See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166,
173 (3d Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); Martin v. United
States, 517 F.2d 906, 915 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975);
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and disallows the imposition of two penalties for the same offense." The
Supreme Court has held that resentencing that augments a sentence previously imposed and partly served violates the double jeopardy clause. 2
Since the interruption of the prisoner's sentence delays his release date, it
prolongs his sentence and increases the penalty he must suffer.29 The policy
of sentence interruption, the dissenting judges argue, is therefore in contravention of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause2 °
The courts of appeals upholding sentence interruption for civil contempt
have been consistent in refusing to allow prisoners jail credit for their
original sentences for time spent in prison for contempt.:" The rationale has
been that a prisoner's incentive to testify would be removed if he would
suffer no detriment for his refusal."2 The courts have been reluctant to
restrict coercive power over a recalcitrant witness merely because he is
33
already imprisoned.
In In re Liberatore4 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt
with the authority of a federal court to interrupt a preexisting state sentence, an issue never previously considered by any court.: The court recogUnited States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 980 (1975). See generally Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957).
27. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1873); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1047 (1977); Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 915 (8th Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).
28. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
29. See United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975). By extending the expiration date of the prisoner's original
sentence, punishment not part of the trial court's first sentence has been imposed on the
prisoner. Since "time is the stuff that life is made of," the additional months of anxiety,
anguish, and delay is increased punishment. Id. at 683 (dissenting opinion).
30. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 173 (3d Cir.
1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); Martin v. United States, 517
F.2d 906, 915 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); United States
v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
980 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, has consistently refused to decide this question by
denying certiorari in each of these cases.
31. See, e.g., In r Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1047 (1977); United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 410, 411 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 924 (1976).
32. See Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
962 (1975); Williamson v. Saxbe, 513 F.2d 1309, 1310-11 (6th Cir. 1975).
33. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966); Williamson.v. Saxbe,
513 F.2d 1309, 1310-11 (6th Cir. 1975); Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). But see Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 913 (8th
Cir.) (dissenting opinion) (states policy reasons for protecting prisoners from sentence interruption), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
34. 574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 84. Judge Waterman noted that In re Liberatore dealt with "an issue not
previously considered by us or by any other court." Id. at 84.
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nized the well-established principle that a federal court can act only upon
constitutional, statutory, or implied authority." The court found that the
only conceivable statutory basis supporting the order was the Recalcitrant
Witnesses statute. 7 In determining that it did not provide the necessary
authority, the court set out three reasons for a strict construction of the
statute. First, it had been suggested that the practice of interrupting a
preexisting criminal sentence may have constitutional infirmities. :5 Since
courts disfavor statutory interpretations which raise constitutional questions, the Second Circuit was hesitant to give the statute broad construction." The second reason involved a recognition of the general historic
limitations on the power of a court to alter even its own criminal sentence
by interruption or modification. 0 Third, tampering with the decision of
another sovereignty is in derogation of common law conceptions of comity." The court also noted that there was no express intention on the part
of Congress that the statute should apply to already imprisoned contemnors1 2 Additionally, the court found no inherent authority to interrupt
.Liberatore's state sentence.43 This lack of inherent authority was based on
the principles of comity which preclude interference with the proceedings
of another sovereignty."
The Liberatorecourt recognized those prior cases in other circuits which
had held that a federal civil contempt sentence could be interposed within
a federal criminal sentence. Agreeing with the dissenting opinions in those
cases, the Liberatore court found that the "fault of the prisoner" theory
did not apply to contemnors who were already imprisoned. '- The court
reasoned that the fault of the prisoner theory was inapplicable because
unlike an escapee or parole violator, a prisoner who refuses to testify does
not intend to avoid his sentence. 6 If the prisoner has no intention to interrupt his sentence, the fault of the prisoner theory cannot apply. 7 The court
36. Id. at 84.
37. Id. at 84; see 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
38. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1978).
39. Id. at 85; see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961);
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80 (2'd Cir. 1977).
40. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1978). To the extent that section 1826 was
alleged to have revised these limitations on the judicial power to interrupt preexisting sentences, the court strictly interpreted the statute because it operated in derogation of the
common law. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 85.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 88.
44. Id. at 88.
45. Id. at 87. The fault of the prisoner theory has been applied to a contemnor who
refuses to testify. See Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir.) (contemnor told
he had key to his own cell), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
46. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 87 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978); see Martin v. United States, 517
F.2d 906, 911-12 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
47. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 87 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978).
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also discussed a basic distinction between Liberatore and the decisions of
other courts of appeals."' Unlike the cases decided by other appellate courts
in which a federal court interrupted a federal sentence, Liberatore dealt
with the federal interruption of a state imposed sentence. 9 Citing the
leading case of Covel v. Heyman,I"the Second Circuit emphasized the rule
that allows the sovereign which first arrests an individual to acquire the
right to prior and exclusive jurisdiction over him."
Although the court explicitly avoided expressing an opinion regarding
the possible constitutional infirmities of sentence interruption, 2 the court
pointed out that such an argument had been made.5" Proponents of that
argument contend that the interruption of an intervening confinement
constitutes double jeopardy to the imprisoned contemnor because its effect
is to extend the expiration date of the original sentence."' It is doubtful that
this double jeopardy argument is sound. The first sentence is not being
replaced by one more severe, nor does the interruption interfere with the
judgment of the first court. 55 The sentence is merely tolled until the
contemnor-prisoner consents to testify."
A primary basis of the Liberatore court's opinion was that the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute could not be interpreted to allow sentence interruption. While Liberatore held that a federal district court had no statutory authority to interrupt a preexisting state sentence,5" it is evident from
dicta in the case that the court felt the interruption of a federal sentence
is likewise impermissible, and perhaps unconstitutional." Although the
48. See id. at 87.
49. Compare id. at 87 (federal court interrupting state imposed sentence) with Martin
v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 908 (8th Cir.) (federal court interrupting federal sentence),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
50. 111 U.S. 176 (1884). The Supreme Court stated that the forbearance which state and
federal courts exercise over each other is something more than comity, something of right and
law. Although the courts co-exist in the same space, they are independent and do not have a
common superior. Id. at 182.
51. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1978).
52. See id. at 85.
53. Id. at 85; see, e.g., In re Grand-Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166,
173 (3d Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); United States v.
Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980
(1975).
54. See Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 916 (8th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).
55. See In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978) (civil contempt confinement
acts to interrupt a sentence, not modify it); Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 910 (8th
Cir.) (civil contempt proceeding is entirely separate court proceeding from criminal case),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
56. See In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); Martin v. United States, 517
F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975).
57. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 85; see In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 173
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other courts of appeals which have addressed this question have applied
the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute to justify interruption of federal criminal sentences,"' the Second Circuit interpreted the statute's language and
legislative history to preclude such interruption." Such a restrictive view
of the statute may not be warranted. No question exists regarding the
authority of a trial court to imprison a contemnor;" the differing views
concern when this imprisonment should take place. 2 To determine when
the imprisonment should occur, it must first be decided whether the

purpose of the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute is to punish or coerce the

contemnor.13 If the intent is to punish, as in criminal contempt, then
clearly there is no need to interrupt a preexisting sentence since the additional contempt confinement can follow the first sentence." A consecutive sentence is appropriate to criminal contempt since there is no need
for immediate service of the sentence as there is in the case of civil contempt." On the other hand, since the purpose of civil contempt is to
coerce the witness to testify, it is equally clear that the imprisonment will
only have its desired effect during the judicial proceedings in which the
testimony is sought." The Recalcitrant Witnesses statute was intended
to empower a federal court to confine a witness who, without just cause,
refuses to provide evidence to a grand jury. 7 Even if the imposition of a
"stacked" rather than a "sandwiched" punishment could be viewed as
coercive, the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute does not provide for this sort

(3d Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 429 UIS. 1047 (1977); United States v. Liddy,
510 F.2d 669, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 980 (1975).
59. See, e.g., In re Garmon, 572 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1047 (1977); United States v. Thurmond, 534 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1976).
60. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1978).
61. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1972); Shillitani v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 30203 (1947) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. See United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 980 (1975).
63. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). Confinement for contempt
is coercive in nature and designed to compel obedience with the court's order. Id. at 368.
64. See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 7.7, 555 F.2d 146, 150 (7th Cir.
1977); Southern Ry. Co. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
65. See United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 980 (1975).
66. See United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 410,411 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 924 (1976).
67. It can be seen from the legislative history that the congressional intent was to coerce
the witness, not punish him. See United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 410, 411 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46,
(purpose is to secure witness' testimony through a sanction, not punish witness by imprisonment), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4022; H.R. REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (intent to codify present civil contempt practice), reprintedin [19701
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4008.
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of imprisonment. 8 The statute only allows imprisonment while the judicial proceedings are in session."
It is unlikely that Congress intended to exclude already imprisoned wit7
nesses from the coercive sanctions of the Recalcitrant Witnesses statute
when all other types of witnesses are subject to them.7 Although the statute does not appear to have contemplated an already incarcerated contemnor, 72 it was clearly the intent of Congress to allow the judicial coercion of
a witness through the threat of possible imprisonment.71 Since imprisonment will not coerce an already imprisoned contemnor, another method of
coercion must be used. The statute, therefore, can reasonably be interpreted to sanction interruption of a federal sentence by a federal court to
coerce a witness.71 Moreover, the Second Circuit's interpretation of congressional intent differs from that adopted by the other courts of appeals.71
The second major basis of the court's decision in Liberatore was that the
federal court had no inherent authority to interrupt a state imposed sentence since the second sentence was imposed by a different sovereignty."
Although the court stated that its decision was based on prinicples of
comity, 77 the decision was actually made on a more fundamental princi68.'See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
69. Id.
70. See Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 908-09 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
856 (1975). "No sound policy reason exists to support a conclusion that prisoners can escape
the application of § 1826(a) when a person charged but not convicted of an offense, or one
convicted but not yet sentenced would be subject to its application." Id. at 908-09; cf.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1972) (government has legitimate demands
to require testimony of citizens).
71. See Martin v. United States, 517 F.2d 906, 908-09 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
856 (1975).
72. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1978).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46, reprinted
in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4007, 4022. The statute's "purpose is to secure the
testimony through a sanction, not to punish the witness by imprisonment." Id. at 4022.
74. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 168-69
(3d Cir. 1976) (coercive effect of section 1826 would be meaningless if credit given), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977); United States v. Thurmond, 534 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1976) (to
allow credit would wholly frustrate the clearly articulated congressional goal); Anglin v.
Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1974) (allowing credit would remove incentive to
compel testimony sought), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
75. Compare In re Libertore, 574 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1978) (dicta) (section 1826 cannot
provide basis for sentence interruption) with In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Hartzell), 542 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 1976) (weight of authority allows sentence interruption under
section 1826), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977).
76. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1978); cf. M'Kim v. Voorhies, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 279, 281 (1812) (state court has no jurisdiction to enjoin judgment of circuit
court of the United States); Diggs v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179, 180 (1807) (circuit court
of the United States cannot enjoin state court proceedings).
77. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 1978). Comity is the forbearance that
courts of coordinate jurisdiction exercise toward each other to avoid conflicts by avoiding
interference with the process of each other. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884).
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pie-preservation of original jurisdiction." This principle prevents conflict
of jurisdiction between federal and state courts." It allows the court that
first takes control of the subject matter of the litigation to exhaust its
proceedings before the other court may attempt to adjudicate it."" The
state courts have a right to be free from federal interference with their
sentences."' It was the state court which obtained prior and exclusive control over Liberatore; therefore, in accordance with the rule, the federal
court had no authority to interrupt the state imposed sentence." Nevertheless, comity principles need not foreclose the possibility that sovereignties
may cooperate in their prosecution of crime. Comity does not require that
one sovereignty stand idly by while the first sovereignty deals with a prisoner.":' The first sovereignty can "lend" the second sovereignty its prisoner
so that he can be tried or can testify in the second's courts while remaining
under, the first's control.' The question then arises whether such a "loan"
permits the second court to interfere with a judgment or sentence of the
'
first sovereignty. 5
The purpose of the lending doctrine is to allow the second sovereignty
to insure a fair trial within its jurisdiction by securing a prisoner's testimony." A prisoner may, with the consent of the first sovereignty, testify
in the second sovereignty's court without an infringement of the comity
doctrine."7 According to Liberatore, when a prisoner who is brought before
78. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176,
182 (1884); Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1971).
79. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 172, 182 (1884).
80. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260 (1922); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176,
182 (1884); Lundsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1942).
81. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 195-96 (1867). Federal courts
of appeals and state courts act separately and independently of each other. Appellate relations exist between the state courts and the Supreme Court, but not between the state
courts and the courts of appeals. Id. at 195-96.
82. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Andy, 549 F.2d
1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion); Lundsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653, 655
(10th Cir. 1942).
83. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 1978); Lundsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d
653, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1942).
84. See Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 261-66 (1922); Zerbst v. McPike, 97 F.2d 253,
254 (5th Cir. 1938). There is a uniform act, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, which
provides for an exchange of prisoners between states to allow that person to be tried in the
court of another sovereignty. To date this act has been adopted by forty-five states and the
federal government. E.g., 18 U.S.C. app., at 4475 (1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-186
(West 1960); TEx. CODE CraM. PRO. ANN. art. 51.14 (Vernon 1979).
85. See In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Ponzi v. Fessenden,
258 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1922); Zerbst v. McPike, 97 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1938).
86. See generally S. REP. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin [19701 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4864, 4865.
87. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 403 F.2d 37, 38 (5th Cir. 1968) (surrender of state
prisoner to federal government is question of comity); Opheim v. Willingham, 364 F.2d 989,
990 (10th Cir. 1966) (jurisdiction and custody are questions of comity).
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